Lada: The New-Generation Submarine That Wasn't

In earlier instalments of this series we showed how Russia's Black Sea Fleet turned the Caliber into its main tool for striking Ukraine — from frigates, small missile ships, and diesel-electric Varshavyankas. For decades the logic behind Russian shipbuilding has been the same: put as many long-range cruise-missile platforms as possible in every sea. Project 677 Lada is marketed as the next, technologically superior step in that same line.

Project 677What Lada Is — and Why It Was Built

Project 677 was developed by the Saint Petersburg design bureau TsKB MT Rubin in the 1990s under chief designer Yuri Kormilitsin; every boat in the series has been built at Admiralty Shipyards (part of the United Shipbuilding Corporation)[1]. Lada was conceived as a universal replacement for the Project 877 Paltus-class Varshavyankas — with lower noise levels among the top requirements[1].

By design it's a multi-purpose boat: destroying enemy surface ships and vessels, patrol duty, reconnaissance, protecting sea lines of communication, laying minefields[1]. An important nuance that tends to get lost: Lada was designed first and foremost as an anti-submarine and patrol asset, not as a strike platform for cruise missiles — its role as a "Caliber carrier" became a deliberate talking point only later, riding the wave of enthusiasm for Calibers after 2015[11].

SpecsTechnical Characteristics

Shown as claimed figures: they haven't been independently verified, and individual numbers vary between sources[14].

SensorsBetting on Sonar

Lada's key claimed advantage isn't missiles — it's "ears." The boat carries a towed sonar array, and, by available accounts, a large conformal array in the bow[13]. Naval analyst H. I. Sutton has assessed that this bow conformal array may be the largest of its type on any non-nuclear submarine[13].

If the specifications hold up, it's the sensors — not the strike potential — that could give Lada an edge: detecting other submarines before it is detected itself.Consistent with the project's original anti-submarine mission[13]

The real performance of Russia's newest sonar suites is not reliably known. But that, not the missile salvo, is where the design logic actually sits — a quiet diesel-electric "hunter" for confined coastal waters.

WeaponsCaliber from a Torpedo Tube: 10 vs. 4

Strike potential is what makes Lada interesting as a threat. The boat has six 533 mm torpedo tubes; the load-out is up to 16–18 torpedoes and missiles or up to 44 mines, and the claimed Caliber capacity is up to ten missiles[14][7]. The same tubes fire the anti-ship Klub and the anti-submarine RPK-6 Vodopad[13].

For comparison: the Project 636.3 Varshavyankas that have actually fired on Ukraine and Syria each carry only four Calibers[10]. On paper, one Lada is worth roughly two to three Varshavyankas in missile salvo terms — and that comparison is the whole point of the "new-generation carrier" narrative.

AIPThe Air-Independent Propulsion That Isn't There

The technology the whole project was built around was air-independent propulsion (AIP) — meant to sharply extend submerged endurance and make the boat much harder to find. The irony is that the USSR/Russia had a head start here going back to the 1950s (the experimental Project 617)[13].

But on Sankt-Peterburg, which served as the prototype, the system never worked, and AIP was effectively dropped for the series — in 2019 Rubin stated outright that the boats would not be fitted with it[13][14]. Instead, development resumed that same year on an electrochemical generator (extracting hydrogen from diesel fuel and oxygen), targeted for completion "in the mid-2020s"; a lithium-ion battery alternative was also discussed, one that could theoretically give a diesel-electric boat very long submerged endurance[13][14].

As things stand, none of the boats built so far has AIP installed[5][11]. Without it, Lada stays noisier and easier to detect — meaning the new generation's headline advantage is still on the drawing board. Western analysts consistently describe the program as a "disappointment"[5].

TimelineFive Keels, Three Boats, 28 Years

Five boats laid down — three afloat or in service, two under construction. The number in parentheses next to each name is the yard (hull) number.

Below is a dossier on each boat. Expand a card to see the full construction history and key dates.

B-58501570

Project 677 · lead boat

Sankt-Peterburg

13 years to build → test platform → scrap

Scrapped · 2024

The lead boat was laid down on 26 December 1997 and launched on 28 October 2004[1]. Trials in the late 2000s already turned up problems with the main powerplant; despite that, the boat was accepted into the Northern Fleet on 8 May 2010[1]. Almost as soon as it reached the crews, it emerged that the sonar and propulsion weren't working properly[11].

In November 2011 a decision was made to rework the lead boat and build the rest of the series to a revised design (control systems, electric propulsion, navigation)[1]. In effect, Sankt-Peterburg was kept on as a test platform for evaluating those systems[14].

On 5 February 2024 it was announced that the boat was being withdrawn from the fleet and sent for scrap: a TASS source said "modernizing it is very expensive — for the same money you could build a new boat"[1]. The lead boat of the project never became a fully combat-capable unit — 13 years of construction ended in the scrapyard[11].

Photo · Sankt-Peterburg on the Neva, Wikimedia Commons, CC BY 3.0

Key Dates

Laid down26.12.1997

Launched28.10.2004

In service08.05.2010

Rework decision11.2011

Scrapped05.02.2024

B-58601571

Project 677 · first series boat

Kronshtadt

19 years from keel-laying to delivery

In service · Northern Fleet

The second boat of the series was laid down on 28 July 2005, but construction was halted in 2009 by the global financial crisis, which hit shipbuilding across the board[1][11]. Work resumed on 9 July 2013, this time incorporating lessons from the lead boat's trials[1]. It was launched on 20 September 2018, but not handed over to the fleet until 31 January 2024[1].

The commissioning ceremony most likely took place at the Polyarny base (Murmansk region); the St. Andrew's flag was presented to the commanding officer by Navy Commander-in-Chief Nikolai Yevmenov, and the boat joined the Northern Fleet's 161st submarine brigade (division)[13]. By size, it's about 61 m long, with a submerged displacement of roughly 2,700 t[13]. Despite the ceremony, the boat was considered troubled from the start[2].

Kronshtadt during sea trials. Photo: Russian MoD

Key Dates

Laid down28.07.2005

Halted2009–2013

Launched20.09.2018

In service31.01.2024

Unit161st Sub. Bde.

B-58701572

Project 677M · ex-Sevastopol

Velikie Luki

Commissioning was postponed at least six times

In service · home fleet disputed

The third boat (hull 01572) was laid down on 10 November 2006 as Sevastopol, construction was halted in 2009, and it was re-laid and renamed Velikie Luki on 19 March 2015[1]. It was launched on 23 December 2022, with the flag not raised until 16 December 2025[1][12]. Trade outlets reported that commissioning had been postponed at least six times[6].

That same day, Russian Navy command announced the laying down of two more boats in early 2026[4][8]. Home fleet is listed as Baltic (per TASS and GlobalMilitary), though some outlets reported Northern: we flag this as an open discrepancy[1][3][14].

Photo · Velikie Luki on the Neva, mil.ru / Wikimedia Commons, CC BY 4.0

Key Dates

Laid down10.11.2006

Re-laid19.03.2015

Launched23.12.2022

In service16.12.2025

Postponements≥ 6

ExportAmur-1650 and Amur-950: The VLS Denied to Russia's Own Navy

Russia tried to recoup costs by selling the project abroad. The export versions were named Amur-1650 and Amur-950[1]. Notably, the Amur-950 was offered with a vertical launch system for cruise missiles (including BrahMos) — meaning foreign buyers were offered a better-armed configuration than the one Russia's own fleet ultimately received[11].

The main prospective customer was India, which was offered joint production. India chose a French design instead, and the Amur export program effectively died — no other buyers materialized[11]. That hurt both the program's economics and its reputation.

OutlookThe Program's Future — Staying the Conventional Course

Despite all of Lada's problems, the Kremlin's overall line is to keep building conventional submarines (unlike, say, the US, which builds only nuclear boats)[13]. Russia's Ministry of Defence claims the fleet received 24 submarines of various types over the past decade — eight times more than the decade before[13]. But it's precisely because of Lada's delays that Russia is still stuck building the less capable Project 636.3 Varshavyankas that Lada was meant to replace[13].

On top of that, the Baltic and the North Atlantic are zones of dense NATO surveillance, where a small diesel-electric submarine has a much harder time maneuvering undetected than in the closed Black Sea.

Lada is genuinely becoming a new diesel-electric Caliber carrier — just far more slowly, in far smaller numbers, and with worse performance than Moscow claims.Less a "new generation of threats" than a stalled build with high paper potential and low delivery

The real question isn't the boat's specifications on paper — it's whether Russian industry can build these boats in series, reliably, under wartime conditions and sanctions[13]. If Russia ever delivers AIP (or the lithium-ion alternative) and moves to serial production, this picture will need revisiting; for now, Lada's actual contribution to the fleet's strike potential is minimal.